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1 Introduction
In works discussing the Bayesian paradigm for presenting forensic evidence
in court, the concept of a ‘relevant population’ is often mentioned, without
a clear definition of what is meant, and without recommendations of how to
select such populations. This note is to try to better understand this concept.
Our analysis is intended to be general enough to be applicable to different
forensic technologies and we shall consider both DNA profiling and speaker
recognition as examples.
We shall limit attention to the canonical forensic problem of having to
decide whether a given suspect and an unknown perpetrator of a crime are the
same or not. To facilitate this decision, there is given two pieces of evidence:
(i) a trace (speech recording, DNA profile, etc.) left behind at the crime
scene by the perpetrator; and (ii) a similar sample (recording, DNA profile)
obtained from the suspect.
We base our analysis on the understanding that in its most general form,
a relevant population is a probability distribution over individuals. As an
example, a relevant population for the perpetrator could take the form: the
perpetrator is male with probability 90% (or female with probability 10%).
We shall discuss the following questions:
Q1: Who should choose the relevant population, the prosecution or the de-
fence?
Q2: Should the relevant population be associated with the suspect, or the
perpetrator, or both?
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Q3: Should the relevant population be chosen before processing the forensic
evidence, or should the forensic evidence be used to make the choice?
We discuss these questions in turn in the following three sections.
2 Q1: Who should choose the relevant popula-
tion?
The goal of the forensic inference is to answer the question whether the
perpetrator and suspect are in fact the same person or not. The two answers
to this question are often termed the prosecution hypothesis (they are the
same) and the defence hypothesis (they are different). This terminology has
the advantage that it makes the contents of the propositions immediately
clear. But it has the disadvantage that it could lead to the misunderstanding
that the finer details of each hypothesis should be respectively formulated by
the defence and the prosecution. By ‘formulating’ the hypothesis, we mean
making all kinds of hypothesis-dependent auxiliary assumptions, including
assumptions about the relevant population.
We argue below however that to be able to perform a coherent inference,
all parties should be in agreement on all assumptions, except on the basic
question at hand. To avoid this misunderstanding, we therefore prefer to use
a more neutral terminology for the two hypotheses:
H1: The suspect and perpetrator are one and the same person.
H2: The suspect and perpetrator are two different people.
By inference, we mean reasoning in the face of uncertainty and the Bayesian
way of doing this is to compute a posterior probability distribution of the
form:
P (H1|E,B) = 1− P (H2|E,B) (1)
where E denotes the evidence subjected to forensic analysis (e.g. DNA pro-
files, or speech samples) and B denotes background information and assump-
tions. Note that everything to the right of the ‘given’ symbol, |, is the same
for both posterior probabilities, otherwise we would not get a well-defined
probability distribution that sums to 1.
If in contrast, one uses the prosecution/defence hypothesis terminology
and additionally, one does not think in terms of the posterior probability
distribution, but instead of a likelihood-ratio between these hypotheses, then
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it is easy to fall into the trap of formulating a meaningless likelihood ratio
of the form
P (E|Hpros, Bpros)
P (E|Hdef, Bdef)
where prosecution and defence assume different background information. If
the inference is to proceed via a likelihood ratio, it should be of the form:
P (E|H1, B)
P (E|H2, B)
where B is the same in numerator and denominator. Our answer to Q1 is
therefore:
2.1 Conclusion for Q1
Whoever chooses the background information (which may include specifica-
tion of a relevant population), should take care that it is the same when
computing the two likelihoods for the two hypotheses.
2.2 Discussion
In principle, it should not matter all that much who chooses the background
information. The end result of the inference is a statement of the form:
• B, the collection of background assumptions.
• The evidence, E.
• The posterior, P (H1|E,B).
In this format, the background information is available for scrutiny. If B is
agreed upon, then also P (H1|E,B) should be agreed upon.
2.2.1 Note on posterior vs likeihood ratio
It is often argued that the forensic scientist should not assign certain types
of prior information, so that the whole of B as defined here is not available
to him/her. Consequently, the posterior also cannot (and should not) be
computed by the forensic scientist. The scientist is then expected to supply
whatever parts of the calculation can be done without the unspecified prior
information, in such a format that, if the missing prior information were
to be supplied, the posterior could be computed in a straight-forward way.
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The canonical example is to factor the posterior odds as the product of
a prior odds and a likelihood-ratio. We shall return to this point later:
unfortunately the simple multiplicative formula becomes more complicated
if there is significant (posterior) uncertainty about the relevant population.
3 Q2: Should the relevant population be asso-
ciated with the suspect, or the perpetrator,
or both?
We are doing probabilistic inference in the face of uncertainty. The primary
uncertainty of interest is the identity of the perpetrator. However, in any
realistic probability model there will be further unknowns (sometimes called
nuisance variables). To do a concrete calculation, we need to assign probabil-
ity distributions to all unknowns. The choice of relevant population can be
understood as conditioning these probability distributions. We shall make
this more concrete by way of an example.
3.1 Example
Our forensic technology is speaker recognition. The crime occurred in an
environment where the population may be characterized in terms of two at-
tributes, namely gender and accent. There are two genders, male and female
and there are two accent classes, native and non-native. This partitions the
set of speakers of interest into four subsets.
The crime is the theft of a mobile electronic device which runs a tutorial
application to teach non-natives how to speak the native language. All parties
agree to condition the inference on the assumption: the perpetrator is non-
native. This fact is therefore included in the background information, B.
There is however no further prior information to make a male perpetrator
more likely than a female, so all parties agree to assign:
P (perpetrator is male|pig) = P (perpetrator is female|pig) = 1
2
(2)
where we have introduced the label pig for later reference to this prior. Nat-
urally, pig is to be included in B.
The stolen device is later recovered, in possession of the suspect, who
is arrested. It is discovered that there is a voice recording, denoted Xr, on
the device, which has been recorded in the course of exercising the tutorial.
It is agreed that this recording is the voice of the perpetrator, although the
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suspect claims it is not his voice and that he does not know how the device
came to be in his possession.
The suspect is clearly male, so that the fact the suspect is male is also
included in B.
The suspect has agreed to provide a speech sample, denoted Xs, but is
otherwise unwilling to give any further information which could characterize
him as a native or non-native speaker. Before considering the suspect speech
sample, all parties agree to assign the prior:
P (suspect is native|pia) = P (suspect is non-native|pia) = 1
2
(3)
where again pia is for later reference and is included in B.
Denoting the combined evidence as E = (Xr, Xs), the end goal of the
inference in this example is to compute the posterior P (H1|E,B), which we
shall do in section 4 below.
For now, notice that we have effectively chosen two different relevant
populations. Before analysing the speech samples:
• the suspect has been classified as belonging to a population of native
and non-native males,
• while the perpetrator has been classified as belonging to a population
of non-native males and females.
It is important to notice that the two populations have a non-empty inter-
section (non-native males). If the intersection were empty that would have
deductively proven H2 to be true, even before the speech samples are anal-
ysed.
We can now answer Q2.
3.2 Conclusion for Q2
There are two relevant populations, one containing the suspect and the other
containing the perpetrator. These populations may be different, but if their
intersection is empty then H2 is trivially true and we do not need any further
analysis of the forensic evidence.
3.3 Discussion
In a very simplistic forensic calculation, the need for choosing a relevant
population for the suspect may be unnecessary. This is generally the case
when there are no nuisance parameters with unknown values. Examples of
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nuisance parameters include hidden variables in generative models, as well
as unknown model parameters.
Consider first the case of DNA profiling where all model parameters are
given and where the possibility of profiling errors is negligible, so that the
measured profiles of the suspect and perpetrator are assumed to be faith-
ful representations of the true profiles. The perpetrator is unknown, so we
still need to assign a prior probability distribution (defined by a relevant
population) over possible alternative perpetrators. But the suspect profile is
given, reducing the relevant population of the suspect to a set with just one
member.
However, as soon as we introduce nuisance variables with unknown val-
ues the need for the suspect relevant population resurfaces. We give two
examples:
• We continue with the DNA example, and we still assume profiling errors
to be negligible. But now (as is done in real DNA calculations), we are
not given fixed values for allele frequencies in the relevant population.
Now new data (such as the suspect’s profile) could change the predictive
probabilities for observing additional examples of the same profile. As
noted above, the forensic analysis is done under the assumption that
the suspect is a member of the relevant population from which the
perpetrator came. But if this population consists of subsets, we may
need to ask to which subset the suspect belongs in order to properly
apply the predictive probability updates.
• In generative speaker recognition modelling, one supposes that each
speaker has a constant, but unobservable speaker identity variable. The
observed speech is considered to be a noisy version of the speaker iden-
tity variable. To test whether two observations come from the same
speaker or not, the values of the hidden identity variables have to be
inferred. This inference needs priors on the hidden variables and these
priors could depend on specification of the relevant population. This
would then require specification of the relevant populations for both
the perpetrator and the suspect.
4 Q3: Should the forensic evidence be used to
facilitate the choice of relevant population?
To answer the final question, let us crank the handle of probability theory to
compute the posterior (1) for the running example, introduced in section 3.1.
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We shall use the terminology that m denotes male; m¯ female; n native;
and n¯ non-native. Also let g(s) and g(r) denote the suspect and perpetrator
genders and a(s) and a(r) the suspect and perpetrator accent classes. For
brevity, we also define c(s) = g(s)a(s) to be the population category of the
suspect and similarly, c(r) for the perpetrator.
We suppose four probabilistic models (with parameters) are given, where
Mga denotes a model for speech recordings produced by people of gender
g and accent class a. Also let M = (Mmn,Mm¯n,Mm¯n¯,Mmn¯) denote
the collection of all four models and we include M as part of B. Let
P (Xr, Xs|H1,Mga) denote the joint probability distribution for two record-
ings of the same speaker; and let
P
(
Xr, Xs|H2,M, c(r), c(s)
)
= P
(
Xr|Mc(r)
)
P
(
Xs|Mc(s)
)
(4)
denote the joint probability for two recordings of different speakers, where
the speaker population classes are given.
Finally, before we can complete the calculation of the posterior, we still
need one more piece of prior information. We have already assigned a prior
probability of 1
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to the intersection (male, non-native), but given the assump-
tion that the evidence lies in this intersection, we still need a prior probability
for H1. We define:
pih = P
(
H1|a(s) = n¯, g(r) = m
)
(5)
Now we pile everything into B
B =
(
pih, pig, pia, g(s) = m, a(r) = n¯,M
)
(6)
and compute the final answer to the whole inference as the posterior:
Pf = P (H1|Xr, Xs, B) = PaPgPh (7)
where
Pa = P
(
a(s) = n¯|Xs,Mmn,Mmn¯, pia
)
(8)
Pg = P
(
g(r) = m|Xr,Mmn¯,Mm¯n¯, pig
)
(9)
and
Ph = P
(
H1|Xr, Xs,Mmn¯, pih
)
(10)
We shall give further details of how to compute Pa, Pb, Pc below and also dis-
cuss how to translate (7) into likelihood-ratio form. But first, we conveniently
use (7) to answer Q3.
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Notice Pa answers the question (after having digested both prior informa-
tion and evidence) whether the suspect accent is non-native. Similarly, Pg
answers the question whether the perpetrator was male. In both of these cal-
culations, the prior and the speech evidence were used in their proper places.
The answer to Q3 is therefore clearly yes, the evidence should be used. Of
course, this was a specific example and the details of the calculation will vary
from case to case.
4.1 Conclusion for Q3
Both prior and evidence are relevant to inferring sub-population membership
of the suspect and perpetrator. Expressing everything in terms of the poste-
rior for the primary question shows how to do these calculations and how to
combine their results.
4.2 Discussion
For a more careful motivation and understanding of our calculations above,
we continue with our running example and give more details of the calcu-
lations. In particular, we show how to formulate the whole calculation in
terms of likelihood-ratios, so that the analysis of the evidence can be made
independent of the prior information.
We denote our prior for suspect accent as pia = P
(
a(s) = n¯|pia
)
and the
prior for perpetrator gender as pig = P
(
g(r) = m|pig
)
. We can now compute
each of the three posteriors, Pa, Pg and Ph, conveniently in odds-against1
form:
O′a =
1− Pa
Pa
(11)
=
1− pia
pia
× P
(
Xs|Mmn
)
P
(
Xs|Mmn¯
) (12)
= Oa ×Ra (13)
Where O′a and Oa are respectively the posterior and prior odds against the
proposition that the suspect accent is non-native and Ra is the likelihood
ratio for native against non-native males. Note Pa can be recovered from the
odds as:
Pa =
1
1 +O′a
(14)
1We could instead work with the reciprocals, odds for, but that gives more complex
formulas in this problem.
8
To get a feel for odds-against, notice that if O′a  1, then Pa ≈ 1−O′a ≈ 1;
if O′a = 1, then Pa = 12 ; and if O′a  1, then Pa ≈ 1Oa  1.
In a similar way, we get the odds against a male perpetrator
O′g =
1− Pg
Pg
(15)
=
1− pig
pig
× P
(
Xr|Mm¯n¯
)
P
(
Xr|Mmn¯
) (16)
= Og ×Rg (17)
and the conditional odds against H1
O′h =
1− Ph
Ph
(18)
=
1− pih
pih
× P
(
Xr|Mmn¯
)
P
(
Xs|Mmn¯
)
P
(
Xr, Xs|H1,Mmn¯
) (19)
= Oh ×Rh (20)
We are now in a position to divide the responsibilities:
• The forensic scientist, who analyses the evidence, computes the likelihood-
ratios Ra, Rg and Rg, independently of the numerical values of the pri-
ors pia, pig and pih. The likelihood-ratios are reported to the court.
• The court (judge/jury) could then theoretically assign numerical values
to the priors (in odds-against form) and apply the three multiplicative
formulas to obtain posterior odds against.
How should the court now proceed to make a final decision? Each of O′a and
O′g could be considered independently and if any of them is too large, then
H1 can be rejected on the grounds that there is a reasonable doubt that the
relevant populations intersect. Otherwise, if both are sufficiently small, then
O′h can be considered for final thresholding against some ‘reasonable doubt
threshold’.
In summary, the court could make three independent decisions: if any of
the three questions casts reasonable (posterior) doubt, then the court finds
for H2.
4.2.1 The additive odds-against formula
However, if the court is just slightly more mathematically adventurous, then
a very simple approximation could combine the three steps into a single test.
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Defining the final posterior odds against H1 to be O′f = 1−PfPf , where from (7)
we have Pf = P (H1|E,B) = PaPgPh, we can compute:
1
1 +O′f
=
1
1 +O′a
1
1 +O′g
1
1 +O′h
(21)
or
O′f = (1 +O′a)(1 +O′g)(1 +O′h)− 1 (22)
= O′a +O′g +O′h +  (23)
where  is a sum of products of the odds. If all of the odds are small, then
each of these products will be very small compared to the sum of the odds
and  can be safely ignored. Now consider2 some reasonable doubt threshold,
θ  1, on the final odds: The court finds for hypothesis H1 only if O′f < θ.
To help to understand this threshold, notice that if O′f < θ  1, then
O′f ≈ 1− Pf = P (H2|E,B). If we make this threshold small, we are saying
that we require the posterior probability for innocence to be small.
With the above approximation, the test is now performed as:
O′f ≈ O′a +O′g +O′h < θ (24)
and notice that if the sum is below the threshold, then also each ofO′a,O′g,O′h <
θ, so that  < 3θ2 + θ3  θ and can indeed be ignored.
In summary, the court has to do two things:
• Multiply each of the three likelihood-ratios by prior odds to get poste-
rior odds.
• Find for H1 only if the sum of the posterior odds is below a small
reasonable doubt threshold.
4.2.2 The hidden variables
This section gives further clarification of the interaction between hidden vari-
ables and the relevant population. The following form of generative model
has been shown to work well in speaker recognition. We suppose that every
person has a hidden identity variable (denoted Y ), which remains constant.
Observations of the speech (denoted X) of an individual will of course vary
and we model this variation as P (X|Y,N), where N is some probabilistic
model for this variation. To complete the picture, we need priors for these
2In Probability Theory: The Logic of Science, E.T. Jaynes suggests in a section entitled
‘Bayesian jurisprudence’ that judges might sleep soundly if they take θ = 110 000 .
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hidden variables and this is where the relevant population is needed: In
this case, the relevant population conditions the prior as P (Y |Mmn¯). The
likelihoods mentioned above can now be more explicitly specified as:
P (X|Mmn¯) =
∫
Y
P (X|Y,N)P (Y |Mmn¯)dY (25)
and
P (Xr, Xs|H1,Mmn¯) =
∫
Y
P (Xr|Y,N)P (Xs|Y,N)P (Y |Mmn¯)dY (26)
where Y is the support of P (Y |Mmn¯).
4.2.3 Model subdivision
Still in the context of our running example, a natural question to ask would
be whether it was really necessary to subdivide our population into four
categories. Could we not simply use a single model for the whole population
and get a much simpler recipe? On the other hand, what about further
subdivision, for example into age categories and so on?
Such questions cannot be answered without much experience with differ-
ent models and their interaction with real data. However, we can make some
general comments.
What we have essentially done in this example was to represent the dis-
tribution for the hidden variables as a mixture model, with four components.
Each of the components could for example be multivariate Gaussian. Now a
mixture of Gaussians is a different model than just one multivariate Gaus-
sian. Different models lead to different speaker recognizer accuracies. The
designer of a speaker recognition system will in general try different model
configurations and choose the one which gives the best accuracy.
Of course, subdivision of the model also supposes that we have enough
development data of each category and it is preferable if the data is la-
belled according to category. In DNA profiling there are similar consid-
erations, definitions of sub-populations depend on the availability of DNA
profile databases. In short, the data available to develop a recognizer will be
an important consideration in deciding whether to subdivide the model.
An advantage of a subdivided model is that we can make use of more
detailed prior information. In our example, we were able to exclude one of
the four categories (native female). This effectively makes the prior perplex-
ity in the problem less and this could be expected to give better accuracy.
When pertinent prior information from non-speech sources is available, then
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a subdivided model can allow this information to be combined with the in-
formation that can be extracted from the speech.
In contrast, the calculation with a monolithic model would have no inputs
for suspect and perpetrator gender and accent. The implicit values for these
parameters could be expected to more or less agree with the proportions
in the development data. But if the resulting speaker recognition model
gave good accuracy anyway, then we would expect a good result regardless,
because speakers from different population groups (e.g. male/female) should
usually be quite easy to tell apart. If the model finds that a pair of different
speakers (who happen to be male and female) are most likely different, then
the extra information about their genders is unlikely to add much value.
In summary, model (population) subdivision depends on may things and
the level and nature of the subdivision is part of an optimization process to
improve accuracy.
4.3 Generalization
In our running example we had strong prior information that allowed us
to make hard decisions about suspect gender and perpetrator accent, be-
fore analysing the speech. If these facts were also a-priori uncertain, then
the relevant populations for suspect and perpetrator would both have been
mixtures of four models, although the mixture weights could in general be
different for suspect and perpetrator.
Consider a general case where there are K categories in the population
(in our example we had K = 4). For each category, Ck, we have a modelMk.
Suppose also we have a prior probability distribution, pis = (pis1, pis2, . . . , pisK)
for the category which contains the suspect and similarly a prior distribution
pir for the perpetrator’s category. This would give the more general formula
for the final posterior as:
Pf = P (H1|Xs, Xr, B) (27)
=
K∑
k=1
P (s ∈ Ck|Xs,M, pis)P (r ∈ Ck|Xr,M, pir)P (H1|Xs, Xr,Mk, pihk)
(28)
where pihk is the prior for H1, given that suspect and perpetrator are both in
category k.
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5 Conclusion
We urge researchers in Bayesian forensic inference to be careful about jump-
ing straight to likelihood-ratio calculation. Considering the posterior as the
final idealized goal of the inference can be a valuable tool in making the
whole inference process sound.
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